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The Future of the Spanish State
in the Wake of Regionalistic Nationalism and Separatist Fervor
by
Deidre J. Jensen

Introduction

In the post-World War II era, demands for
regional autonomy have been a recurring
feature in Western Europe. These demands
have been based on the inability of the
modern nation-state to solve all of the political, economic, and social problems it faces.
As regions are continually confronted with
an inadequate central government that is
limited by a lack of resources and political
will, those peoples who feel most alienated,
deprived, or exploited will agitate for more
control over their own affairs. Nowhere is
this situation more prevalent than in modern
Spain.
Since its founding, Spain has been a
nation of varied cultures, languages, governments, and histories. Although attempts
have been made to unify these diverse peoples, the historical differences between the
regions have

continued to threaten the existence of the
centralized state. Moxon-Browne gives two
explanations for this grave situation. First,
as a result of the historical uneven economic
development of Spain, a situation of "internal colonialism" has emerged. This has
been characterized by the exploitation of the
poorer regions by those that are more economically advanced and by the refusal of the
economically strong regions to contribute to
the development of the rest of the nation.
The economic deprivation on the one hand
and the refusal to share the wealth on the
other, especially when coupled with ethnic
pride, have both led to nationalistic fervor,
agitation for regionalist autonomy, and, at
times, the use of violent methods (MoxonBrowne 1989, 41).
Second, as in the Basque country, periods of rapid industrialization have brought
many immigrants into the region. The
resulting social upheaval has created a feeling of alienation among the native people, a
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fervent ethnic and cultural consciousness,
and a desperate grasp for their traditional
and historical roots. This emerging nationalism has also quickly led to a desire for
regional autonomy (Moxon-Browne 1989,
41). Although not exclusive, these are two
of the many possible explanations for the
regionalist sentiment which has continually
Even
influenced the history of Spain.
though the Spanish government has tried to
address this problem by granting partial
autonomy to the regions, many regions such
as Catalunya, the Basque country, and
others will not be satisfied without further
concessions. If concessions are not made,
there is a possibility that at least the Basque
country and Catalunya, the most economically strong regions in Spain, will demand
their independence. Unless this situation
changes drastically, the continuance of a
unified Spanish state will be threatened by
escalating conflicts between the regions
agitating for more autonomy and the central
government fighting to save its disintegrating nation.

Historical Back2round
Spain, until the fifteenth century, had been
a nation of diverse peoples separated by
geographical boundaries and ruled by separate governments. When modern Spain was
finally unified through the marriage of
Queen Isabel of Castile and King Ferdinand
of Arag6n in 1469, the capture of the last
Arab stronghold in Granada in 1492, and the
annexation of the Northern kingdom of
Navarre in 1512, Spain had already developed somewhat of a federal system of government. For example, when Charles I (the
grandson of Ferdinand and Isabel) came to
power, he was not known as the King of
Spain but rather as the King of Castile,

Le6n, Arag6n, Navarre, etc. Not only that,
but he had to promise to "respect the administrative, legal, financial, and cultural idiosyncracies of each kingdom or principality"
(Newton 1983, 100). This federal system
lasted until the seventeenth century when the
Bourbons of France tried to unify the administration of the country. Spain was soon
divided into fifty artificial provinces which
cut across regional boundaries. This situation did not change until the nineteenth
century.
A multitude of wars during the l800s
retarded Spain's material progress and
increased social and political divisions within the country. In the meantime, frustration
with the inertia and interference of the
Madrid bureaucracy led the Basque country
and Catalunya to pursue their own paths of
economic development.
Failure of the
centralized government to create a nationwide industrial complex coupled with the
rising nationalist sentiment of the Basque
country and Catalunya meant that by the
1900s, economic, social, and political differences between the regions and the central
government were irreconcilable. Although
attempts at granting partial autonomy to the
regions were made initially, following the
Civil War (1936-39), General Franco, the
military dictator, prohibited any evidence of
regionalism and autonomy. He desired a
unified state with one language (Castilian),
one leader (Franco), 3.'1d one church (Catholic). His regime was one of intolerance,
repression, and centralization. However, his
programs only succeeded in revitalizing
regional cultures and creating strong opposition to the concept of a unified Spain.
Following his death, the presence of regionalist nationalism and the desire for autonomy
was greater than it ever had been previously.
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The post-Franco era was characterized
by a resurgence in the autonomy movement,
which occurred for a variety of economic,
political, cultural, and demographic reasons.
In part, it was a reaction to years of oppressive government centralization throughout
the history of Spain. Also, it began because
of the social tensions which had arisen
between the immigrants and native peoples
in various regions throughout the country.
In addition, it could be attributed to the
uneven economic development between the
regions and the methods taken by the central
government to remedy that situation. Finally, it was a result of increased regionalist
nationalism, ethnic consciousness, and deepseated historical differences which were
impossible to reconcile (Donaghy and Newton 1987, 98). Whatever the reason, the
regions in the post-Franco era demanded
autonomy and decentralization. Their demands were met by the constitution of 1978,
the Constitution of the refurbished democratic Spain.

The Constitution of 1978
The Constitution of 1978 was a document of
compromise which, although not ideal, was
considered to be the primary step towards
more regional autonomy. It contains an
interesting mixture of centralized government and regional autonomy which is neither a federal system nor a nation-state
system. It primarily discusses the rights of
regions, the process of becoming autonomous, and the roles and responsibilities of
both the central and regional governments.
The regions of Spain are guaranteed
autonomy in Article 2 of the Constitution.
This article states that the "constitution is
based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible

motherland of all Spaniards, and recognizes
and guarantees the right to autonomy of the
nationalities and regions of which it is composed" (Donaghy and Newton 1987, 100).
(See appendix one). It is interesting to note
that the central government mentions the
indissoluble union of the state before it
mentions autonomy to express the overriding
idea that the centralized state will continue
even in the presence of autonomy.
After autonomy is guaranteed, Article
143.1 talks about the territorial basis for the
establishment of autonomous regions. It
declares that only "adjoining provinces with
common historical, cultural and economic
characteristics . . . will be able to accede to
self-government and form autonomous
communities" (Donaghy and Newton 1987,
100). This historical basis not only ensures
autonomous privileges but it is the deciding
factor in the length of time it will take to
acquire autonomy. The regions, such as the
Basque country, Catalunya, and Galicia,
which had historically voted in a referendum
to be autonomous could proceed quickly
towards full autonomy. The rest of the
regions would have to wait five years after
the approval of their statutes before they
could gain the same full autonomy guaranteed to the historic regions. According to
Donaghy and Newton, this was to give them
time to organize their own governmental
institutions for housing, public works, forestry, environmental protection, museums,
libraries, cultural affairs, tourism, social
welfare, health, and hygiene, etc. After the
regions gained autonomy, they would have
the primary control and jurisdiction over
each of these areas in their own territories
(Donaghy and Newton 1987, 113).
In addition to being able to control the
areas mentioned above, each autonomous
government is guaranteed the right to create
and execute its own laws, to exercise finan-
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cial autonomy (within the state's overall
responsibility for taxation), to control its
own budgets and educational system, to
write its own statutes (regional constitutions), to establish the parameters of its
relationship with the central government,
and to have its own capital city, flag, civil
service, and supreme court.
In contrast, there are certain powers
which belong solely to the central government. These include immigration, political
asylum, defence and the armed forces,
customs and trade barriers, the monetary
system, general economic planning, authorization of elections and referendums, overall
administration of justice, and the signing of
international agreements and treaties (Donaghy and Newton 1987, 114-115).
In addition, the constitution declares that
certain powers can be delegated by the
Federal Parliament to be shared by both the
federal and the regional governments.
These powers include the overall system of
communications, the ports and airports of
general interest, the post and telecommunications, the control of air-space and transport, and the academic professional qualifications.
The Spanish Constitution as it exists
today contains many strengths. It delegates
a great deal of authority to autonomous
regions while at the same time maintaining
the unity and cohesion of the state under a
centralized government. It is an extremely
important document for the Spaniards because it is the first constitution to acknowledge the multinational and multilingual
character of Spanish society and to establish
the principle of governmental decentralization. However, having these strengths does
not necessarily mean that this constitution
will be acceptable indefinitely. As regions
are experimenting more with autonomy they
are beginning to feel independent of the

central government. In fact, certain ones
are even considering total independence as
their next step. Since most of those advocating separatism are the economically
strong regions such as the Basque country
and Catalunya, it would be financially destructive to Spain if they succeeded. Not
only that, but it is quite possible that separation and independence for these regions
could create a tidal wave of regionalistic
sentiment which would result in the dissolution of at least part of the Spanish nation.
For these reasons, the Spanish central government is fighting against further separatist
concessions. The future of this struggle
could bring about many significant changes
in favor of one side or the other. At this
point all that is certain is that autonomy has
been granted and will not be relinquished
easily, neither the central government nor
the separatist regions plan to budge on their
demands, and, at some point in the future,
concessions will need to be made by somebody. In order to understand the events that
will surely happen, it is necessary to discuss
1) the factors which have caused regionalism
to occur; 2) the extreme cases of separatism-Catalunya and the Basque country; 3)
regionalism in other areas of Spain; 4) the
response of the central government; and 5)
what the future holds for the continuance of
Spain, the modern state.

Catalunya

Catalunya is a region of Spain which borders France to the north, the Mediterranean
Sea to the west, the Ebro basin to the east,
and coastal hills to the south. Because of
her geographical location, she has been
relatively isolated throughout a large part of
her history from the other areas of the
Iberian peninsula. As a result, her history

,

,
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has been distinct from that of the rest of
Spain.
Up until the fifteenth century, Catalunya
was an autonomous region ruled by the
counts of Barcelona. In 1289 the Generalitat de Catalunya was established which
"defined the traditional Catalonian liberties
and privileges as a bastion against the Centralizing encroachments of the Spanish
Crown" (Moxon-Browne 1989, 25). Catalunya's political identity was not threatened
until the male line of the counts of Barcelona became extinct in 1410 and the Catholic
kings unified Spain, including Catalunya, in
1469. At this point, Castile exercised the
most influence because of an economic
boom, her monopoly on trade with the
Americas, and few legal barriers. As a
result, Catalunya "which had been the major
component of the Catalan-Aragonese monarchy, lost political importance and influence
although it retained control over its own
affairs" (Coverdale 1979, 25).
Finally, in the seventeenth century it was
able to reassert its influence by refusing to
join the Hapsburg monarchy until its autonomy had been guaranteed (1653). However,
with the entrance of the Bourbon kings
during the 1700s, Catalunya lost the autonomy she had gained. This loss was soon
offset by her growing economic vitality;
she was even more prosperous in 1760 than
was Castile. During the 1700s regional
differences persisted but the Catalans supported the Spanish monarchy during the
French Revolution and the Napoleonic
Wars. In fact, Coverdale believes that by
this time, "a workable equilibrium had been
reached in which Catalunya could participate
in a larger Spanish national undertaking
without renouncing altogether its linguistic
and ethnic identity" (1989, 26).
This equilibrium was disturbed, however, during the 1830s when the liberals at-

tempted to impose a centralized government
on Spain. Nevertheless, during this time
Catalunya's economic strength was unequaled, she experienced a cultural renaissance,
her language was used in literature and
science, her citizens studied her history, a
pride in her traditional institutions emerged,
and a fervent nationalism created the desire
for autonomy. Autonomy came in 1932 but
it was rescinded shortly after Franco came
to power following the Spanish Civil War.
In addition, Franco prohibited the use of
Catalan in schools and books, declared that
cultural associations were illegal, and prohibited all Catalan cultural expressions. In
Catalunya during the Franco regime, this
fierce repression served only to "unite her
people in widespread opposition to a hated,
centralist regime" (Newton 1983, 109) and
to "reinforce the desire of the Catalans to
regain their autonomy" (Moxon-Browne
1989, 48). In the post-Franco era, Catalunya pushed for autonomy and, in the
Constitution of 1978, was one of the first
three regions to achieve it. In this way
alone she was different than the majority of
the other regions of Spain.
However, Catalunya's distinctiveness
with the rest of Spain goes much deeper
than her history. Her citizens just simply
feel different than and separate from their
fellow Spaniards. A New York Times article
dated 26 September 1989 described the
Catalans in the following way:
Hard working, prosperous and deeply proud of
their Catalan language and culture, the people of
Barcelona Spain make no secret of their belief that
their city's selection as the site for the 1992 Olympic Games is further proof that they are just a
touch superior to other Spaniards.

According to Moxon-Browne, the superiority that the Catalans feel is based on "past
history, linguistic distinctiveness, and a
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feeling of being different from the Castilian
majority in Spain" (1989, 49). This feeling
is demonstrated more clearly in appendix
two which shows that nearly 40 percent of
the citizens of Catalunya feel more Catalan
than they do Spanish. In other words, they
identify more with their region than with
their nation. Another poll among young
people in Barcelona in 1984 showed the
same results. Moxon-Browne declares that
"27 percent said they felt 'only Catalan' and
a further 16 percent felt more 'Catalan than
Spanish'" (1989, 48). Furthermore, the
Catalans define their identity in terms of
their language and culture instead of in
terms of the Spanish culture and the Castilian language (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad
1988, 319). Because of this regional nationalism and immense pride in their culture and
their history, many Catalans would like to
see an independent state (19 percent in the
1984 poll) and most would like to receive
more autonomy from the central government. This is shown clearly by the end
result of the 1984 elections in which the
foremost nationalist party, the CiU, won an
absolute majority in the parliament with
46.6 per cent of the vote. Since 64.4 per
cent of the voters went to the polls, it is
obvious that many of the Catalan people
support their regional parties and government (Moxon-Browne 1989, 49). (Further
information on the percentages of Catalan
support for more autonomy is available in
appendix three). Therefore, although the
Catalan region most likely will not separate
from Spain in the near future, the presence
of a desire for more autonomy or for independence will be a continual threat to the
nation-state of Spain in the years to come.
Regionalist nationalism and distinctiveness is manifested by the pride of the Catalans in their language. The Catalans believe that theirs is a "language of culture,

with an important literature and a significant
number of scientific works published" (Coverdale 1979, 23-24). The language, Catalan, is a mixture of French and Spanish.
Throughout Catalunya everything is written
in this language primarily and then the
Castilian language follows. Conversations
on the street are normally held in Catalan.
In addition, and this is true in many other
areas of Spain, the greatest majority of
citizens speak their regional language at
home and over half speak it regularly in the
workplace. In fact, "language is clearly a
badge of Catalan identity: those who do not
speak it find jobs difficult to get and the
pressure to learn the language and become
integrated into Catalan society is therefore
almost irresistible" (Moxon-Browne 1989,
49). In other words, in order to preserve
their culture, the Catalans not only use
Catalan in their homes but also they force
the immigrant community to learn the language and customs and, therefore, to be
Catalanized (Gunther, Sani and Shabad
1988, 319).
The Catalans probably would not have
such a dramatic influence over the immigrants in their region if they did not have
such a strong economy. Immigrants come
from regions allover Spain to take advantage of the monetary rewards to be had in
the industrial and service sectors of the
booming Catalan economy. Not only does
this economy provide jobs to Spaniards but
it also contributes a large percentage of
revenue to the Spanish government. Therefore, it is important to the continued vitality
of the Spanish state. The Catalans realize
their vital role and take pride in their economic prowess. This economic prowess,
for some, is an encouraging factor on the
road to separatism because they believe that
Catalunya is strong enough to survive as an
independent state. Others also justify sepa-
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ration based on economic prowess but for a
different reason. These Catalans believe
that they have been the victims of economic
discrimination at the hands of the central
government because of the "inegalitarian
impact of Spanish taxation and spending
policies. . . . Nationalist leaders have long
maintained that revenues derived from the
Basque area and Catalunya [to be used for
the development of the poorer areas of
Spain] have far exceeded the value of public
services received by them" (Gunther, Sani,
and Shabad 1988, 325). Therefore, pride in
their economic prowess, culture, language,
and history and feelings of economic discrimination playa major role in the justification by many Catalans of increased autonomy and/or separation from the Spanish
state.

The Basque Country

The Basque country is a region of Spain
which borders France to the west, the Bay
of Biscay to the north, los Montes Cantabricos to the east and small mountains to
the south. Because it is at the most northern
point of the Iberian peninsula, the Basque
country, like Catalunya, has been relatively
isolated throughout a large part of her history. As a result, her history has been distinct
from that of the rest of Spain.
At the time of the formation of the
Spanish state by the Catholic kings, the
provinces of the Basque country had already
belonged to the crown of Castile for several
centuries. According to Moxon-Browne, the
Basques had been allowed to use fueros,
local statutes, since the seventh century
(1989, 51). In addition, they had been
allowed to retain "their local customs, institutions, and languages throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centu-

ries" (Coverdale 1979, 32) in exchange for
their allegiance to Castile and their use of
the Castilian language in both government
and culture. Because of this arrangement,
the centralization of the Spanish state did not
affect the Basque country as terribly as it
did Catalunya. During the nineteenth century, the Basque country was able to pursue
regionalist policies and soon became the
center of Spanish heavy industry and mining. As a result, the Basques were able to
participate even more effectively in the
economic and political life of Spain.
Basque autonomy was first challenged
and eradicated when the liberals came to
power in the early nineteenth century. The
jueros were abolished in 1876 and customs
posts on the Ebro were removed. Because
of this, the Basques lost "an important
symbol and component of economic autonomy" (Moxon-Browne 1989,51). In order to
reassert their independence, the Basques
formed a nationalist party (PNV) in 1895
under the tutelage of Sabina de Arana. This
party was based on a close identification
with the Catholic church and a desire for
ethnic purity, especially in the wake of the
immigration brought on by the Basque
illdustrialization process. The nationalist
party renamed the Basque country Euskadi,
made a new flag, and encouraged people to
speak the Basque language. Although it did
not receive much popular support initially,
it became the forerunner to the intensely
Basque nationalist party of today, the ETA.
The ETA (Euskadi ta askatasuna) was
originally a simple nationalist movement in
the 1950s. It began in response to the
repressive policies pursued by the Franco
dictatorship.
Franco had deprived the
Basque provinces of their economic and
administrative autonomy, prohibited the use
and teaching of the Basque language, burned
Basque books, forbidden Basque musical

..
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instruments and the wearing of the Basque
national colors, removed the Basque language from tombstones and public buildings,
and Castilianized all names and inscriptions.
In response to this, the ETA organized and
dedicated itself to the independence of the
Basque country from Spain.
When it was first organized, the ETA
did not advocate violence as an acceptable
method of achieving change. However, the
organization soon committed itself to armed
struggle (1967) in response to the Francoist
tactics it had to combat. Since 1968, over
600 murders of Spanish public officials and
police officers have been committed in the
name of regionalist nationalism (The Christian Science Monitor, January 31, 1989).
ETA has justified its actions on the grounds
that it must raise consciousness among the
Basque people, protect the people against
the repressive apparatus of the central government, and confront the government in the
only language it understands (MoxonBrowne 1989, 55). Not even the concessions made in the Constitution of 1978 have
stemmed the terrorist activities. Actually,
the transition to democracy was accompanied by an "increase of violence--from 29
deaths in 1977, to 88 in 1978, to 131 in
1979" (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1988,
246). In 1988 alone, nineteen people were
killed (Washington Post, February 26,
1989). Even though the ETA called a selfimposed truce for two months during 1989,
the violence will probably not cease until the
Basque country is granted independence
from Spain. Although support for ETA's
violent tactics is not widespread in the
Basque country (only 42 percent of the
extreme nationalists and 9 percent of the
more moderate group sympathize with
ETA), the organization does reflect the
sentiments of a large section of the Basque

population who want more autonomy or
independence at any cost.
The desire for Basque independence is
so strong (as shown in appendix three)
because of the intense regionalist nationalism
which is prevalent there among certain
groups. This nationalism can be attributed
to many factors, one of which is the influx
into the Basque country of non-Basque
immigrants and businessmen who have
created social upheaval and have diluted the
ethnic purity of the Basque people. Therefore, the Basques desire to disassociate
themselves from further ethnic contamination through independence. Moreover, the
Basque nationalist ideology is based on a
"dedication to the Catholic faith, the belief
that all Basques should be united across the
Pyrenees, and the assertion that language
should be the defining characteristic of the
Basque race" (Moxon-Browne 1989, 52).
Again, regionalist supporters assert that
independence or more autonomy would aid
the Basques in achieving these nationalistic
goals.
Another reason for their separatist desires is that many Basques do not consider
themselves to be Spaniards at all. Appendix
two shows that at least half of the Basque
people do not readily associate themselves
with the Spaniards. Instead, the Basques
"rest their claim to autonomy on their ethnic, cultural and, above all, linguistic distinctiveness" (Newton 1983, 112) from the
rest of Spain. In other words, they believe
they are a separate ethnic group whose
language is an obvious manifestation of this.
In reality, there is some truth to their assertions. The Basque language is distinct in
that its origins are unknown and it has no
connection with any other European language. Because of this, the Basques are
able to guard the purity of their language
and, with it, create a barrier for the mixing
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of foreign blood with the ethnic purity of
their race. Therefore, their language is an
important factor in their struggle for autonomy, independence, and ethnic purity.
Another important factor is their economic prowess. Like Catalunya, the Basque
country is one of the more developed regions of Spain. Therefore, it can be reasonably confident that, were it to gain its independence, it would be able to survive on its
own. It too rallies around the idea of economic discrimination by the central government in its justification for separatism. Like
Catalunya, it pays nearly a third of all taxes
and receives only a small percentage of
services in return. Therefore, pride in their
economic prowess, culture, language, and
history and feelings of economic discrimination playa major role in the justification by
many Basques of separation from the Spanish state.

Other Reeions
Although the separatist or autonomist fervor
in other regions is not nearly so pronounced
as it is in Catalunya and the Basque country,
regionalist sentiments do exist elsewhere in
Spain. During the drafting of the Constitution of 1978,
preferences for varying degrees of autonomy and
even for independence, as well as support for
regional parties, were present in other culturally
and linguistically distinct regions, such as Navarra,
Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Andalucfa and the
Canary Islands [who had] no previous aspirations
for, or historical experiences with, self-government
(Gunther, Sani, and Shabad, 382).

For example, one of the most startling
results of the 1979 election was the success
of the Partido Socialista de Andalucfa
(PSA). This party received 11 percent of

the vote in Andalucfa and obtained five out
of the fifty-nine seats allotted to the region.
"The meteoric rise of the PSA was the most
dramatic instance of the spread of demands
for autonomy in Castilian-speaking and
indisputably 'Spanish' regions of the country" (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1988,383).
Support in the other regions for more autonomy and/or independence can be found in
appendix three. Although most regions at
this time do not advocate independence,
many at least want limited autonomy from
the central government. After experiencing
the ability to control their own affairs it is
possible that more regions will advocate
greater autonomy in the future, especially if
concessions are made in the Basque country
and Catalunya.
The desires for autonomy in other regions are based on various factors. First,
the existence of various languages other than
Castilian, such as Gallego Portuguese,
Andaluciano, Valenciano, etc., encourages
an association with a region instead of with
the state. Next, the geographical features
which cut across the Iberian peninsula have
isolated various regions from one another
and, as a result, have resulted in distinct
peoples with distinct histories. The historical differences are compounded by the
cultural influences each region has had (such
as the Arabs who settled southern Spain as
opposed to the Romans, Christians, and
Europeans who settled northern Spain).
Furthermore, the economic discrimination
which the poorer regions have suffered at
the hands of the larger regions, especially
under internal colonialism, has created a
fierce loyalty to oppressed regions. And,
finally, the historical lack of control over
their own affairs has made many Spanish
citizens desire more regional autonomy or
independence. Each of these factors plays a
certain role in the regionalist sentiment of
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each area of the peninsula. Although this
sentiment is not as pronounced in the other
regions and those who strive for autonomy
may be in the minority, regionalist sentiment
of whatever degree or intensity is dangerous
to the continued existence of the Spanish
state.

The Central Government's Response
To assert the overall authority of the state,
the Spanish government declared in the
Constitution of 1978 that Castilian was the
official language of the state and that all
Spaniards must know and use it. In addition, the central administration has been
very protective of the rights guaranteed it by
the constitution and has refused to grant
more concessions to the regions (for example, it refuses to negotiate with the ETA
separatists in the Basque country). To
discourage further separatist fervor the
Spanish Parliament has passed anti-terrorist
legislation which gives the police the right to
search homes of suspected ETA members
without a warrant and to intercept mail and
telephone conversations (Moxon-Browne
1989, 57-58). In addition, the government
has offered amnesty to those individuals who
will agree in writing to renounce terrorism.
These are a few of the tactics the central
government is presently using to quell the
regionalist nationalism that is plaguing the
Spanish state. However, all the evidence
shows that "the process of devolving political power to the regions is far from complete and daunting problems remain to be
surmounted" (Donaghy and Newton 1987,
117).
First, the central government needs to
decide whether it wants a centralized, federal, or disunified governmental system. If it
is not moving in the direction it desires, it

should act accordingly. Regardless of which
system the centralized government chooses,
creative choices and innovative policies are
required to ensure that the system is successful. For example, Lancaster suggests
that the government lower the costs of
staying with Spain for the highly separatist
areas, such as the Basque country, through
tax incentives (1987, 586). Whether or not
the government considers this solution to be
valid, it will soon need to come up with
ideas of its own in order to win the war of
devolution.
In addition to this, the government must
impose limits to the autonomy of regions.
Granting autonomous powers "may mean
yielding some of the powers which central
authorities themselves believe to be necessary to the uniform provision of effective
government" (Moxon-Browne, 64). Already,
a sense of identification with the Spanish state is
intersected by strong ties of allegiance to regional
governments. The concept of the Spanish nation
inevitability risks being further diluted as voters
look to regional governments for bread-and-butter
services, and to regional flags and other symbols
for expressions of cultural distinctiveness (MoxonBrowne, 63).

This problem is further exacerbated if the
regional government, like that of Catalunya,
provides superior services than those provided by the central government. If the central
government does not move quickly to assert
its influence in some way over its citizens in
the various regions, it will soon be thought
of as an incapable and outmoded institution.
This process could take time but it will
eventually lead to the total devolution of the
Spanish state.
Second, the government must decide
how it will be able financially to handle the
process of devolution which seems to be
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occurring. Paying for eighteen separate
governments instead of only one is a very
expensive proposition and will require much
forethought. In addition, Newton believes
that a major financial test of the current
system will be the ability of the central
government to,
tackle the serious economic problems faced by
regions like Andalusia, Galicia, Extremadura, and
Castile while not alienating the richer areas like the
Basque Country, Catalunya, Asturias and Cantabria
which will be obliged to contribute to their development through the Interterritorial Compensation
Fund (125).

This will be a difficult task considering the
fierce resentment of the economically advanced regions toward this system.
Finally, the government must decide
how to deal with the lack of solidarity that
exists between the differing regions which,
at this point, threatens the continuance of the
Spanish state. This problem is obvious in
the constant fighting between the Basques
and the central government and in the resentment of the Basque country and Catalunya to the uneven distribution of services
under the Interterritorial Compensation
Fund. Furthermore, interregional problems
could occur between those regions who
believe that they deserve preferential treatment because of their history and ethnicity,
such as the Basque country and Catalunya,
and those regions which are created simply
because of geographical factors. The central
government must devise a plan to ensure
equality while, at the same time, abating the
cries for preferential treatment (Donaghy
and Newton 1987, 118). This, like all the
other issues which need to be addressed,
will be difficult to solve but it is vital to the
survival of the current governmental system
and the continuance of the modern state of
Spain.

Conclusion
Although the problems I have just considered bode ill for the continuance of the
Spanish state, the regionalist nationalistic
sentiments by no means guarantee the total
devolution of Spain. First, these sentiments
do not necessarily represent the viewpoints
of every citizen of Spain. In fact, in certain
areas those with regionalistic sentiments are
in the minority. For many others, a strong
sense of state nationalism and pride in Espana exists which eclipses the regional
nationalism. Second, despite varied cultures
and histories, all Spaniards share certain
experiences and elements of their culture
with all other Spaniards. Ironically, argues
Newton, one of the most prevalent characteristics common to all Spaniards is precisely their tendency to separatism. In other
words, the more separatist a Catalan, a
Basque, or an Andalucian is, the more
Spanish he reveals himself to be. (1983,
127) If citizens focus more on the ties they
have with their neighbors than on the ways
in which they are different, this common
culture could be the saving grace of the
Spanish state. Finally, all regions must be
willing to compromise. The Castilians must
renounce the idea that the nation was created
only by them and must, instead, accept the
specific contributions of each region. It
must also be willing to accept a more decentralized and diverse state. On the other
hand, the regions, while enjoying their
autonomy, must remember to demonstrate
their loyalty to the whole, and must temper
their own demands so as to achieve what is
in the best interest for everyone involved.
If many of these things do not happen, Spain
as we know it will soon disintegrate into a
collection of economically strong regional
states and a unified nation comprised of
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economically backward entities. If many
of these important changes are made, Spain

as a unified state will continue to rule effectively for centuries to come.

APPENDIX ONE

The Autonomous Communities of Spain
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APPENDIX TWO

National Self-Identification in Euskadi, Catalunya, and Galicia
Gunther, Sani, Shabad pg. 244
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APPENDIX THREE

Proportions of Regional Populations Favoring Varying
Degrees of Autonomy
Gunther, Sani, and Shabad pg. 248
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